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EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah,
No. 09-4122, 2010 WL 4456986 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 2010).
Low-level radioactive waste ("LLRW") is the byproduct of many
important industries and manufacturing processes. By the end of the
1970s, the nation had just three functioning LLRW disposal sites.
Policymakers agreed it was essential to encourage states to build more
LLRW disposal facilities. However, due to restrictions on state
protectionism found in the Constitution's Dormant Commerce Clause, a
state could not prevent waste from entering a disposal site based on the
waste's state of origin. As a result, states were weary of building disposal
sites if they had no way of protecting themselves from becoming dumping
grounds for the nation's LLRW. Acknowledging this challenge, Congress
in 1980 enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act ("1980
Act"). This legislation gave states the authority under the Constitution's
Compact Clause to enter into interstate agreements to deal with LLRW on
a regional basis, and statutorily preempted Dormant Commerce Clause
concerns. Congressionally approved compacts would have the force of
federal law to exclude LLRW generated outside of the compact region.
The 1980 Act stated that it was the responsibility of each state to
provide for the "availability of capacity either within or outside the state
for disposal of [LLRW] generated within its borders." However, the 1980
Act provided no incentives to enter into a compact, nor did it include any
penalties for failing to provide the capacity to handle waste. As a result,
no new LLRW disposal sites were created and the only compacts formed
were around the three preexisting disposal sites.
Congress addressed the deficiencies of the 1980 Act by enacting
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
("1985 Act"). The statute repealed and replaced the 1980 Act and
provided penalties for states failing to provide disposal capacity, as well as
increased financial incentives for states that created new LLRW disposal
sites.
In January of 1986, Congress passed the Omnibus Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act ("Consent Act"). The
Consent Act provided congressional approval for several interstate
compacts, including the Northwest Compact on Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Management ("Northwest Compact") and the Rocky Mountain
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Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact ("Rocky Mountain Compact").
The Consent Act declared that the approved compacts were set forth "in
furtherance of [the 1980 Act]." The Northwest Compact included eight
states: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. According to its text, the Northwest Compact had
"exclusionary authority" to deny facilities located in member states
authorization to dispose of LLRW generated outside the compact area.
Decisions on allowing the disposal of this sort of LLRW were made by the
Northwest Low-Level Waste Compact Committee ("Northwest
Committee"). The Northwest Committee was comprised of one official
from each member state and required a vote of two-thirds of all members,
including the member state in which the facility was located, to enter into
such arrangements.
In 1991, Utah granted EnergySolutions' Clive, Utah, facility a
license to dispose of LLRW. Utah specifically required the Clive Facility,
through a condition in its license, to obtain permission from the Northwest
Committee before disposing of any radioactive waste generated outside
member states. In 2007, EnergySolutions entered into an agreement to
decommission nuclear power plants located in Italy. As part of this plan,
EnergySolutions would dispose of the resulting LLRW at its Clive facility.
The Northwest Committee voted unanimously to deny EnergySolutions
permission to import the waste.
EnergySolutions subsequently filed suit against the Northwest
Compact, claiming: (1) the Northwest Compact did not have statutory
authority over the Clive facility; (2) federal law preempted the decision to
exclude foreign-generated LLRW; and (3) the decision to exclude foreign-
generated LLRW violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. The United
States District Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment in
favor of EnergySolutions on the first claim and did not rule on the second
two claims since the ruling on the first rendered the others moot.
The district court concluded the Northwest Compact, as well as the
other LLRW interstate compacts approved by Congress through the
Consent Act, had only the authority explicitly granted to them in the 1980
and 1985 Acts. Because the district court concluded the Clive facility was
not a "regional disposal facility," as defined in the 1985 Act, it held the
Northwest Compact did not have authority to exclude foreign-generated
waste from the Clive facility. The Northwest Compact, along with the
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state of Utah and the Rocky Mountain Compact as intervening defendants,
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that the lower court erred in looking only
to the 1980 and 1985 Acts to determine congressional authorization. It
noted that the language of the Consent Act transformed the Northwest
Compact "from mere agreement into federal law." Specifically, the Tenth
Circuit found that the lower court erred in three ways. First, the court
mistakenly concluded the 1980 Act had any ongoing application to the
grant of congressional authority under the regional compacts. The 1985
Act repealed the 1980 Act entirely. As a result, the district court began its
analysis in the wrong place by focusing first on the 1980 Act. Second, the
district court assumed the compacts approved by the Consent Act could
not grant any authority not already contained in the 1980 and 1985 Acts.
However, "enabling statutes," like the 1980 and 1985 Acts, are not
necessary for states to form an interstate compact if Congress gives
expressed or implied approval to an agreement the states have already
joined. Congress approved the Northwest Compact in the Consent Act,
thus the district court should have credited the language of the Northwest
Compact in the first instance. Finally, the district court relied on the
vague general provisions of the 1985 Act to conclude the Northwest
Compact does not have exclusionary authority over the Clive facility. The
lower court incorrectly ignored the Consent Act's express consent to
exclusionary authority found in the Northwest Compact. Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit held the Northwest Committee had authority to exclude the
importation of waste from Italy, or any other waste generated outside the
Northwest Compact Region.
EnergySolutions advanced four other arguments the court found
unpersuasive. First, it pointed out that in the Consent Act Congress
consented to the Northwest Compact "subject to the provisions of the
[1985] Act." It contended that Congress' conditioning its consent on
compliance with the 1985 Act negated the more specific definition of
"facility" found in the Northwest Compact. EnergySolutions claimed the
definition of "facility" found in the 1985 Act did not include the Clive
facility. The Tenth Circuit found the definitions not to be in direct conflict
with each other, and held the definition found in the Northwest Compact
to control. Second, EnergySolutions argued that a clause in the 1985 Act
stating the Northwest compact may not be construed to limit the
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applicability of any federal law or to diminish or otherwise impair the
jurisdiction of any federal agency limited the effect of the compact on
federal law. However, the Tenth Circuit found that by approving the
Northwest Compact, Congress abrogated the application of the Dormant
Commerce Clause to the Northwest Compact's authority over LLRW
entering the Clive facility. The court concluded that the clause did not
limit this express grant of authority. Third, EnergySolutions argued that
allowing the Northwest Compact to exclude out-of-region LLRW from the
Clive facility would give it power to regulate the facility out of business.
The court found this argument to oversimplify the purpose of the 1985 Act
to prevent the states from becoming dumping grounds for the nation's
LLRW. Finally, EnergySolutions argued that because the Clive facility is
the only facility in existence not operating as a regional disposal facility,
the decision that the Northwest Compact had no exclusionary authority
over the Clive facility would not have affected any other compacts. The
court found that the only way this would be true is if the 1985 Act
provided that limitation, not the Northwest Compact. That legal
conclusion would affect all other compacts, and could greatly undermine
the agreements made by other states.
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the Northwest Compact was
statutorily and constitutionally permitted to exercise exclusionary
authority over the Clive facility, and reversed and remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with its opinion.
MARK ABBOTT
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Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2010)
In Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co. the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the Clean Air Act's
("CAA") preconstruction permitting process only applied to construction
or modification of major emitting facilities. Thus, in the Plaintiff's citizen
suit alleging that Defendants violated the CAA in their failure to obtain
Prevention of Serious Deterioration ("PSD") permits for a series of
modifications, the court dismissed the action stating that the claims were
time barred. Because these claims were time barred, the Plaintiffs claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief were also barred under the CAA.
Finally, the court determined that the lower court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to review the Plaintiffs claims under New Source
Performance Standard (hereinafter "NSPS") of the CAA.
Otter Tail Power Company operates the Big Stone Generating
Station. Otter Tail Power Company, along with MDU Resources Group
and Northwestern Energy (collectively, "Otter Tail") own Big Stone
Generating Station ("Big Stone"). Since beginning operations in 1975,
Big Stone has undergone various modifications. It is these modifications
that Sierra Club alleges violated the PSD and NSPS obligations under the
CAA.
There are three modifications asserted by Sierra Club that triggered
Otter Tail's obligation to seek PSD permits. First, in 1995 the plant
switched to subbituminous coal. Sierra Club claimed this significantly
increased the plant's emissions of nitrogen oxides and particulate matter.
Second, in relation to the 1995 modification, in 1998 Big Stone's boiler
was modified to increase the surface area of its primary super-heater.
Sierra Club claimed this modification increased the plant's emission of
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. In neither instance did Otter Tail
apply for a permit, as Sierra Club asserted they were obligated to do so.
Finally, in 2001, the factory underwent modifications to allow it to supply
steam to a nearby ethanol plant. Otter Tail applied to the South Dakota
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") to allow
the ethanol plant project. DENR invited public comment on the permit
application, however Sierra Club did not participate in this process.
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DENR concluded that the modifications did not trigger NSPS or PSD
requirements, thus DENR approved the amended permit. In the instant
case, Sierra Club alleged that the ethanol plant project did trigger the
NSPS and PSD requirements.
The Eighth Circuit first addressed the timeliness of the claims
asserted by the Sierra Club. While the CAA does not specify a statute of
limitations, Sierra Club and Otter Tail agreed that the general federal
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, applied and there was five years
from the date the claim first accrued to commence suit. Moreover, the
CAA citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3), authorizes suit
"against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or
modified major emitting facility without a [PSD] permit...." In the instant
case, the last of the modifications was performed in 2001. It was not until
June 2008 that Sierra Club first commenced the citizen suit.
The question whether the CAA's preconstruction permitting
process prohibits the construction or modification of a facility without a
PSD permit as a one-time obligation, or whether they impose ongoing
operational requirements was one of first impression for the Eighth
Circuit. As the court noted, the language of the CAA's citizen suit
provision is narrowly limited to construction or modification. Other
provisions, like 42 U.S.C. § 7411(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 766la(a), use the
word 'operate.' Thus, if Congress had intended for the citizen suit
provision to include 'operate' they would have included that word in the
provision. Therefore, the court concluded that although 40 C.F.R. §
52.21(r)(1) initially imposes an obligation to obtain a permit, it ties that
obligation explicitly to construction or modification and not operation.
Therefore, while Otter Tail may have violated 40 C.F.R. §52.21(r)(1) in
the first place, by not applying for a PSD permit, they did not violate the
PSD permit by continuing to operate. The court concluded that Sierra
Club did not file their claim in a timely manner and as such, Otter Tail
does not violate the PSD obligations of the CAA in continuing to operate.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Sierra
Club's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the concurrent
remedy doctrine. The concurrent remedy doctrine provides that "where a
party's legal remedies are time-barred, that party's concurrent equitable
claims generally are barred." As articulated in earlier Eighth Circuit
cases, "where a legal and equitable remedy exist for the same cause of
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action, equity will generally follow the limitations statute," hence the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the equitable remedies were time barred.
In their final claim, Sierra Club asserted that under the 2001
modifications to the plant, Big Stone triggered emission level limits under
the CAA's NSPS program. The district court held that Sierra Club should
have raised this claim administratively during the DENR period. The
Eighth Circuit asserted that had Sierra Club taken this step, they would
have been able to obtain judicial review of the NSPS claim in the district
court. However, since Sierra Club had the opportunity to raise this issue
earlier, 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(2) precludes judicial review of EPA action,
thus the district court concluded they lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over this claim. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Sierra
Club's NSPS claim was barred by 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(2), since they had
the opportunity bring the claim up during the DENR period, effectively
foreclosing the district court's review of the claim. For the above reasons,




Humane Society of the United States v. Locke,
No. 08-36038, 2010 WL 4723195 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2010)
In March 2008, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS")
authorized the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho to kill up to
eighty-five California sea lions per year at the Bonneville Dam under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"). The Bonneville Dam is
located on the Columbia River, and serves as a migration path for a
number of salmonids, including five salmon and steelheads species. The
states believed that California sea lions were killing off these salmonids,
each of which is listed as a threatened or endangered under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), and therefore submitted an application
to NMFS requesting permission to lethally remove the sea lions. After the
states submitted the application, NMFS assembled a task force to evaluate
the application. Seventeen of eighteen members of the task force
concluded that the sea lions had a "significant negative impact" on the
recovery of salmonids and recommended approval of the application.
In compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), NMFS also conducted an environmental impact assessment
("EIS"). After completing the assessment, NMFS found that killing the
sea lions would have no significant impact on the quality of the human
environment and therefore no EIS was necessary under NEPA. NMFS
authorized the states to lethally remove eighty-five sea lions per year for
an initial period of five years.
The Humane Society of the United States was the sole dissenter on
the NMFS task force and initiated the instant action, claiming that the
NMFS's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"). The United States District Court for the District
of Oregon granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo.
First, the court found that NMFS's decision to grant the states'
application was arbitrary and capricious for several reasons. The court
reasoned that NMFS did not give a sufficient explanation for its finding
that sea lions have a significant negative impact on the decline or recovery
of salmonids. The explanation given was insufficient in light of the fact
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that NMFS had conducted similar studies from 2003 to 2007, and in each
instance found that sea lions did not have a significant negative impact on
the salmonid population. Although the previous reports were not on
record, the court found the discrepancy between the previous reports and
the current assessment to be too great to ignore. Further, human
harvesting of the salmonids had a greater mortality impact than the sea
lions, but a previous report found that this mortality rate had no significant
impact. As a result, the court remanded the decision back to NMFS to
either reconsider or provide a satisfactory explanation for its decision.
Second, the court was asked to determine whether an EIS was
needed under NEPA. Whether an EIS is needed when an action will have
a significant beneficial impact but not a significant adverse impact on the
environment is a case of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. The court
chose not to rule on the issue, having already determined that the record
did not demonstrate a significant beneficial impact on the human
environment. The court additionally found that no EIS was required,
despite the plaintiffs' arguments that: (A) lethal removal of the sea lions is
controversial and uncertain; (B) that the action could have potentially
lethal consequences for Stellar sea lions, which are listed as threatened
under the ESA; and (C) that the removal of the California sea lions would
eliminate sea lion viewing opportunities near the dam.
Third, the plaintiffs argued that the lower court abused its
discretion when it granted the defendants' motion to strike the previous
environmental assessments because they were not in the administrative
record. The court held that it may consider documents not in the record if
it is necessary in determining whether the agency considered all relevant
factors. Because the agency did not explain the rationale for its decision
or the inconsistency between the current report and those of previous
years, the court held that the lower court should not have struck the
reports, and reversed the defendants' motion to strike.
Finally, the court held that NMFS's use of bioenergetic modeling
to supplement the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' observations was not
arbitrary and capricious, and therefore deferred to the agency's decision.
NMFS believed that the Corps' observation-based estimates undercounted
the number of salmonids killed by sea lions. Therefore, NMFS began
using bioenergetic modeling to give it a more accurate count. The
plaintiffs claimed that this method produced unreliable estimates, but the
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court found that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently demonstrated that the
estimates were unreliable. The court held that even if the plaintiffs had
been able to show that bioenergetic modeling count was unreliable, NMFS
primarily relied on the Corps' initial estimates to approve the states'
application, and used the bioenergetic data only as a secondary source.
MEGAN L. DITTMANN
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Government of the Province of Manitoba, v. Salazar
691 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2010)
The Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation
("Reclamation") must reexamine approval of Northwest Area Water
Supply Project's ("NAWS") plan to divert water from Lake Sakakawea via
pipeline to ten counties in North Dakota. The District Court for the
District of Columbia ordered Reclamation to take a "hard look" at the long
term effect of draining water from Lake Sakakawea and the possibility of
contaminating the Hudson Bay Basin with biota from the Missouri River
Basin.
NAWS is a partnership formed between the federal government
and the State of North Dakota in an attempt to provide a solution to poor
water supply in and around the town of Minot. The area served by NAWS
currently relies on ground water from an aquifer that is replenished by the
Souris River. The Souris River lies in the Hudson Bay Basin and flows
south from Canada into North Dakota before flowing back north into the
province of Manitoba. Lake Sakakawea is a reservoir fed by the Missouri
River which lies in the Missouri River Basis and drains to the Gulf of
Mexico.
Recent reservoirs built in Canada have reduced the flow of the
Souris River and affected the quality of the groundwater supplied in the
Minot area. The NAWS-backed approach is a proposal for a pipeline that
would pump 500 million gallons of water from Lake Sakakawea every
year. The water would be partially disinfected and pretreated before
flowing through pipes across the continental divide between the Hudson
Bay and Missouri River basins before being distributed in the NAWS
service area around Minot, North Dakota. Water around Minot is part of
the Hudson Bay Basin and drains into the Souris River and then into
Manitoba.
The initial suit was brought in 2002 by Manitoba under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claiming Reclamation had failed
to prepare an adequate Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). NEPA
requires federal agencies to prepare a preliminary Environmental
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Assessment ("EA") before taking any major actions. If after an EA is
complete, the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact
("FONSI"), then the requirement for the EIS, a more substantial study, is
waived. In its initial suit, Manitoba alleged that the EA failed to take a
"hard look" at the risks of transferring biota from the Missouri River Basin
to the Hudson Basin. The court ruled in favor of Manitoba, ordering
Reclamation to revisit its FONSI, but allowed work to continue on the
pipeline as long as it did not affect the environment.
In 2008, Reclamation issued an EIS concerning the treatment
options for water from the Missouri Basin. The EIS incorporated and
reissued the agency's previous EA and FONSI. Manitoba, joined by the
State of Missouri filed suit, claiming that the EIS and the incorporated
documents were prepared contrary to NEPA. The instant decision
concerned motions in favor of summary judgment from both the plaintiffs
and the defendant and a motion for a permanent injunction from Missouri.
The court held that the EIS failed to address two primary issues: the effect
of drawing down Lake Sakakawea and the risk of contamination of biota
from the Missouri River Basin into the Hudson Bay Basin.
The court noted that Reclamation looked only at its project in
isolation and did not consider other projects that use water from Lake
Sakakawea in assessing the water level issue. The court noted that there
are already projects that would be using Lake Sakakawea as a source and
ruled that Reclamation should have taken this into account when preparing
the EIS. As for the issue of contamination, the court also found that
Reclamation failed to take the required "hard look." While the EIS
addressed the issue of primary contamination of water flowing through the
pipe through treatment plans, the court found that it failed to account for
leakage or possible spills along the pipeline's route. In addition, the EIS
failed to consider an alternative approach by treating the water completely
at the source in the Missouri River Basin which would prevent any biota
contamination before it entered the pipeline into the Hudson Bay Basin.
The court denied Missouri's request for an injunction but issued a
ruling requiring Reclamation to again take a "hard look" at the projects
effect on the water level of Lake Sakakawea and the potential for biota
contamination to the Hudson Bay Basin. The court also chided
Reclamation, noting that the agency "has wasted years by cutting corners
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and looking for shortcuts..." and "...has yet to do what NEPA demand
[s]... .
JOSHUA K. FRIEL
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Huffman,
625 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2010)
The West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection
("WVDEP") must obtain a permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") to
discharge pollutants into waterways during mine reclamation efforts. In
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffinan, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the CWA and the
regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
require permits for anyone who discharges pollutants into United States
waters, even if a mining company created the need for reclamation. In
addition, the statute contains no exceptions for state agencies involved in
reclamation efforts and instead explicitly includes agencies within its
scope.
Coal mining often contaminates water by making the water acidic.
To address this issue while still allowing for coal mining, the CWA allows
mining companies to apply for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permits that limit the amount and types of pollutants
that can be discharged into waterways. States are allowed to petition to
run their own NPDES permit programs, which West Virginia has
successfully done. The NPDES permits issued by WVDEP include an
obligation to neutralize the adverse effects of the acid mine drainage. In
order to guarantee that mine operators are fulfilling this requirement, the
permits require the operators to post bonds with the state. These bonds,
however, are sometimes not enough to cover the cost of clean up and
WVDEP must finish treatment using money from the Special Reclamation
Fund, which is funded by a tax on coal mined within West Virginia.
In 2007, the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy and West
Virginia Rivers Coalition (collectively, "the Conservancy") requested
water quality data from sites where WVDEP had been involved in mine
reclamation efforts. The Conservancy filed suit under the citizens-suit
provision of the CWA alleging that WVDEP was required to obtain
permits at those sites because the agency was violating the CWA by
discharging pollutants into waterways. WVDEP did not issue itself any
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permits despite having issued permits to the former site operators. In
addition, WVDEP had only issued itself one permit for a bond forfeiture
and that was after the agency was sued by the Conservancy. WVDEP
contends that NPDES permits are unnecessary for the bond forfeiture sites
because permits are not needed when a state agency is cleaning up acid
mine drainage created by others.
The Conservancy, in its suit, requested declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring WVDEP to get NPDES permits for the bond forfeiture
sites within thirty days. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia granted the Conservancy's motion for summary
judgment. The district court also entered a final judgment ordering
WVDEP to apply for the NPDES permits within 180 days and to actually
obtain those permits within 360 days. WVDEP appealed that decision to
the Fourth Circuit.
WVDEP made several arguments that it should be exempt from
obtaining an NPDES permit. First, WVDEP argued that it should be
exempt from the permit requirements because it is a state agency.
WVDEP also argued that it should not have to obtain the permits because
it did not create the acid mine discharges and that requiring the agency to
issue permits to itself would be "ridiculous." Finally, WVDEP argued that
because it could not comply with the permit requirements, it would be
futile to require them.
The court analyzed the statute as well as WVDEP's arguments and
determined that the CWA is a broadly worded statute that plainly declares
"the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." See 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2010) (emphasis added). In addition, EPA determined
that the required "person" in the statute applies to state agencies and also
issued regulation where the agency "reemphasize[d] that post-bond release
discharges are subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act," and "[i]f
a point source discharge occurs after a bond release, then it must be
regulated through an NPDES permit." 50 Fed.Reg. 41298 (Oct. 9, 1985).
The court, because of this, determined that both those who create and
those who facilitate ongoing discharges must obtain NPDES permits.
The court also determined that the CWA has no causation
requirement. The statute, on its face, prohibits discharge of pollutants by
any person regardless of whether that person was the cause of the
discharge. In addition, case law has also rejected a causation requirement.
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See United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992). Also, in South
Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that only the creators of the pollutant require an
NPDES permit. 541 U.S. 95, 104-05 (2004).
Finally, the court noted that although compliance with the
requirements is difficult, it is inappropriate for the court to rewrite laws
when parties have difficulties following the requirements. The court
found that Congress instituted the permit requirement in order to protect
natural resources, and also, whenever Congress implements permit
requirements, it generally leads some regulated entities to complain.
Instead of changing the permit requirements, the court suggested
alternative changes that WVDEP can pursue, including petitioning to
Congress or to EPA to create exceptions to the CWA for state agencies or
increasing the funds available for reclamation. Accordingly, the Fourth




Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Associates, L.P.,
No. 09-51079, 2010 WL 4725044 (5th Cir. Nov. 23, 2010)
Sandy Creek Energy Associates ("Sandy Creek") began
construction to build a coal-fired power plant in Texas in 2008. In order
to build a power plant in Texas, companies, like Sandy Creek, must get
state and federal permission. In Texas, prior to construction, the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality ("TCEQ") performs a "Maximum
Achievable Control Technology" ("MACT") determination before
construction to ensure compliance with the federal Clean Air Act
("CAA"). Compliance with the CAA requires that any plant that is
considered a "major source of hazardous air pollutants" cannot be built
until a determination is made that the plant uses the best available
technology to control emissions. The plant in the instant case falls under
this description because it will emit more than ten tons of mercury per
year.
After Sandy Creek submitted its plan for the plant, TCEQ declared
no MACT determination was needed because the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had recently implemented its
"Delisting Rule," which stated that EPA no longer regulated coal-fired
power plants. Consequently, Sandy Creek began construction of the plant
in 2008. Shortly after commencing construction, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the EPA's Delisting Rule, declaring that EPA did not
have authority to stop regulating coal-fired power plants. Once this
decision came down, Sandy Creek was in violation of the federal
requirement of obtaining a MACT determination.
Subsequently, a group of citizens sued to stop construction of the
plant. The district court held that the requirement for a MACT
determination did not apply to Sandy Creek because it was not being
enforced when plans for the plant were finalized. The citizens appealed
claiming that the district court erred and the requirement of a MACT
determination does apply to Sandy Creek even though it was not being
enforced when the project was started. Sandy Creek claimed that because
it prepared and filed an application for a MACT determination before
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beginning construction, the response from EPA that Sandy Creek did not
need one was effectively a MACT determination.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit determined that Sandy Creek was
bound by the federal requirement of a MACT determination even though
it was not being enforced when they applied for clearance for the project.
As the court emphasized, the statute states that "no person may construct"
a plant without a MACT determination and that the wording of the statute
did not indicate that a determination is only required before construction,
but that a company must have the determination at all phases of
construction. Since compliance is required throughout the construction
process, not just before construction, Sandy Creek must come into
compliance now that the Delisting Rule is vacated.
In response to Sandy Creek's claim that because they filed for a
MACT determination, the response from EPA was effectively a MACT
determination, the court concluded that just because a determination was
asked for does not mean a determination was given.
The court held that Sandy Creek would not be penalized for their
construction prior to the vacated Delisting Rule, but all construction done
after the Delisting Rule was vacated is in violation of the requirement of a
MACT determination. Therefore, the court ruled that a determination




Sierra Club v. Kimbell, 623 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2010)
In Sierra Club v. Kimbell, a proposed forest plan for Superior
National Forest was challenged as to the Forest Service's ("Service")
adequacy in evaluating the edge effects on the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area Wilderness ("BWCAW"). While Sierra Club was granted standing
to challenge the forest plan, the forest plan was ultimately affirmed
because the Service did give an adequate "hard look" to the environmental
consequences of the plan, as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA").
The BWCAW is part of the Superior National Forest, which is
subject to the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA") that directs the
Secretary of Agriculture to "develop, maintain, and revise forest plans for
units of the National Forest System." A forest plan is a "general planning
tool" that "establishes the overall management direction for the forest unit
for ten to fifteen years." The forest plan must be developed in compliance
with NEPA. In July 2004, the Service issued a new forest plan for
Superior National Forest. Sierra Club and others sought judicial review of
the plan, alleging that the plan violates NEPA by failing to consider the
plan's effect on the BWCAW.
The plan that the Service chose to implement included a Spatial
Zone, bordering the BWCAW, that allows for timber harvesting and
motorized recreational activities. The Act officially creating the BWCAW
ended logging within the area and greatly restricted the use of motorized
recreational vehicles. Sierra Club's main concern is the edge effect on
BWCAW because of the logging and motorized recreational activities that
are going to be allowed in the bordering Spatial Zone.
The district court in granting the Service's motion for summary
judgment held that the Service did consider the impacts on the BWCAW
in accordance with NEPA. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals started its
analysis with the issue of standing. The court found that Sierra Club had
standing due to the immediate and concrete consequences for the
recreational interests of specific visitors to the Superior National Forest
that would result from the Service's adopted plan. The court then turned
to Sierra Club's main argument regarding NEPA that the Service's
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adopted forest plan was the "direct result of the agency's inadequate
consideration of the effects of the various alternatives on the BWCAW."
If true, the inadequate consideration would result in a NEPA violation by
the Service. The court examined the Service's Final Environmental
Impact Study ("FEIS") to see if the agency adequately considered the
environmental consequences of the proposed forest plan on the BWCAW.
After looking over the FEIS, the court held that the Service took a "hard
look" at the consequences of the revised forest plan.
The court, in affirming the lower court's holding, stated that the
Service intended to act with neutrality concerning: (A) the BWCAW; (B)
the Service's evaluation of the impacts on the wilderness area; and (C)




Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York
615 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2010)
In December of 2007, the City of New York ("City") issued new
rules pertaining to taxicabs put into service after October 1, 2008. These
taxicabs must achieve at least 25 city miles per gallon. Additionally, if the
taxicab was put into service after October 1, 2009, the taxi must achieve at
least 30 city miles per gallon ("MPG"). However, on March 26, 2009, the
City repealed the 25/30 MPG rule in favor of new rules regulating the
lease caps on taxicabs (a lease cap is the maximum dollar amount per shift
for which taxis can be leased). Under these new rules, if the taxicab is a
non-hybrid, non-clean diesel vehicle (nearly all non-hybrid taxis are Ford
Crown Victorias), the lease cap is lowered by $12, effectively reducing the
possible revenue potentially earned by that taxi. To qualify for an
upwardly adjusted lease cap of $3, the vehicle must be a hybrid or clean
diesel vehicle (collectively termed "hybrid").
Plaintiffs, including the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade and
several taxi fleet operators, sued the City seeking to enjoin the 25/30 MPG
rule and later amending their complaint to enjoin the new lease caps on the
basis that it violated preemption clauses in the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act ("EPCA") and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction based on the economic impact these
rules would have on the fleet owners.
At an evidentiary hearing on the motion, Plaintiffs' expert testified
that the new lease caps would decrease fleet owners' profits by 65% to
75% for each non-hybrid vehicle owned. The City did not challenge this
estimate and merely argued fleet owners could still make a reasonable rate
of return on their purchase of a Crown Victoria. In order to justify a
preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs had to show: (1) irreparable harm
absent injunctive relief; (2) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (3)
that the public's interest weighs weighing in favor of granting an
injunction. After reviewing the evidence and statutory language, the
district court concluded the severe disparity in the expected profits from
leasing a hybrid as compared to a Crown Victoria would leave fleet
owners with no rational alternative to leasing a hybrid and amounted to a
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de facto mandate to purchase hybrid vehicles. Thus, the disparity is
related to both fuel economy standards and the reduction of vehicle
emissions and is therefore sufficiently likely to be preempted under the
EPCA and the CAA. The district court granted the injunction. The City
appealed, maintaining only that the Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on
their preemption claims.
The Second Circuit reviewed the grant of a preliminary injunction
for abuse of discretion. In order to be overturned, the district court must
have rested its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or have
made an error of law.
First, the court examined Congress's intent in writing the
preemption clause at hand. The relevant EPCA provision essentially
states that a state is forbidden from adopting or enforcing any law or
regulation that pertains to fuel economy standards for automobiles already
covered by that Act. Also, per established Supreme Court preemption
jurisprudence, if a state law contains a reference to the preempted subject
matter, or makes the existence of the preempted subject matter essential to
the law's operation, then federal law preempts state law. As such, the
question asked of the City's new regulations is whether the regulations
contain a reference to fuel economy standards, or make fuel economy
standards essential to the operation of the new rules.
The court found the new rules relied on a distinction between
hybrid and non-hybrid vehicles, which essentially was a distinction
between vehicles with greater or lesser fuel-efficiency. First, the EPCA
specifically draws a distinction in fuel economy standards when
considering "dual fueled" vehicles, including hybrids. Additionally,
imposing reduced lease caps solely based on whether or not a vehicle has
a hybrid engine has no purpose other than to manage fuel economy across
the taxi fleets operating in the City. Even the City itself was unable to
identify any plausible alternative reason for the imposition of such engine-
based rules. Therefore, the new rules regulating lease caps make fuel
economy standards integral to the rules' operations and fall squarely
within the EPCA preemption clause.
The Second Circuit determined the district court's "mandate
analysis" was irrelevant to the issue at hand because the rules directly
relate to fuel economy standards. Also, because the plaintiffs showed a
likelihood of success with their claim under the EPCA preemption clause,
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the court found no reason to determine whether the CAA would also
preempt the City's new rules for purposes of affirming an injunction.
Because the plaintiffs were able to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits of their claim that the EPCA would preempt the
City's new rules, the grant of a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of new lease caps was affirmed.
KATIE VOGT
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Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2010)
States may, in certain circumstances, have the right to allow
foothold traps that can potentially take an endangered or threatened
species. In Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that incidentally trapping endangered or
threatened species with foothold traps is not a violation of the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA").
In 2000, the U.S. Fisheries and Wildlife Service ("FWS") named
the Canada lynx, a wild cat found in Canada and the northern United
States, a threatened species in some Western states and states that border
Canada, including Maine. Maine, in accordance with the ESA, prohibits
the trapping of Canada lynx but allows the trapping of other animals under
certain regulations. However, traps that were set legally to capture other
animals have incidentally trapped the Canada lynx.
In October 2006, the Animal Protection Institute ("API") brought
suit over the protection of the Canada lynx. The suit resulted in a consent
decree, which extended protections over the Canada lynx significantly.
Under the decree, Maine issued regulations in 2007 and 2008 which
reduced the legal size of foothold traps to five and three-eighths inches in
areas where lynx were prevalent. The regulations also required trappers
who incidentally trap Canada lynx to report those incidents, so that
biologists from the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife
could examine and care for the captured and injured lynx before releasing
them back to the wild. However, the consent decree would expire if the
Canada lynx is taken off the threatened species list, or if FWS accepted
Maine's application for a federal "incidental take permit" ("ITP") and
issues the permit. The ITP would allow trapping that captures threatened
or endangered species, if those takings were incidental to otherwise lawful
trapping practices. However, when engaging in lawful trapping practices,
trappers would need to take certain measures to minimize and mitigate
harms so that these permitted incidental takings would not "appreciably"
impact the threatened or endangered species. Maine's first draft ITP
application was filed in August 2006, its complete application was filed in
2007, and Maine filed a revised application at the request of FWS in
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August 2008. FWS has not yet issued the ITP, so the consent decree is
still in effect.
In August 2008, two private animal protection groups, the Animal
Welfare Institute and the Wildlife Institute of Maine (together "AWI"),
sued under the ESA citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). AWl
alleged that by allowing trappers to obtain permits to use foothold traps to
catch other animal species that are not endangered or threatened, Maine
violates the ESA because some lynx will be incidentally caught in those
otherwise legal traps. Foothold traps spring shut on an animal's leg or
foot, and keep the animal in place in the trap until the trapper returns to
either kill or release the animal. There is no evidence of any Canada lynx
being killed using foothold traps, but, in Maine, a small number of Canada
lynx are caught using those traps each year. The lower court denied relief
of permanent injunction, stating that absent proof of irreparable injury, an
injunction would not be awarded. AWI then appealed to the First Circuit.
The First Circuit found that AWI had standing to sue for injunctive
relief barring foothold trapping that could incidentally injure a Canada
lynx. In order to obtain a permanent injunction, the plaintiffs must show:
"(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."I The court,
for purposes of the case, assumed that the incidental taking of Canada lynx
in foothold traps results in a violation of the ESA. However, the court
recognized that the Supreme Court has said that courts are "not
mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of the
law."
AWI's claim was to the contrary, asserting that courts must
automatically issue an injunction where there is a continuous violation of
the ESA, regardless of the facts surrounding the violation. AWI based this
claim on the Supreme Court's decision Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
where the Court found that only a permanent injunction against bringing a
$100 million dam online would suffice to remedy the Tennessee Valley
' Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010) (quoting eBay Inc.v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
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Authority's violation of the ESA. Operation of the dam would have
completely destroyed the entire habitat of an endangered snail, which
would have resulted in the species' extinction. The Supreme Court has
since distinguished the case's harsh outcome from other cases because of
the undeniable showing of irreparable harm if the injunction weren't
given-an entire species would become extinct.
The First Circuit found that the circumstances surrounding the
Canada lynx are not so serious or urgent. AWI was not able to prove that
any single Canada lynx had suffered serious physical injury or died from
being caught in a foothold trap, let alone risk the danger of extinction as in
Hill. The court held that the lower court's denial of a permanent foothold-
trapping injunction was not an abuse of discretion. Without demonstration
of irreparable harm, which seems only to be evidenced through possible
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Professor Jesica Gilbert authors our lead article, Assessing the
Risks & Benefits ofHydraulic Fracturing. Gilbert explores the history of
fracing and delves into how it has the chance to usher America into an age
of energy independence. Ms. Gilbert also explains the controversy
surrounding the fracing process and gives a timely analysis of current
legislation and litigation surrounding fracing. In exploring the fracing
debate, Ms. Gilbert draws attention to the increasing tension between
America's national energy goals and its environmental policies. Ms.
Gilbert discusses the current lack of regulation of the fracing industry and
predicts how certain agencies might address the concerns inherent in
hydraulic fracturing. She concludes with sound advice to those in the
fracing business, including warnings about insurance policies, ideas for
educating the public about the benefits of fracing and urges vigilance in
monitoring the tumultuous regulatory landscape for this industry.
Ari Peskoe authors our second article, A Challenge for Federalism:
Achieving National Goals in the Electricity Industry. In this piece, Mr.
Peskoe traces the long and varied tug-of-war between the federal and state
governments for jurisdiction over electricity regulation. Mr. Peskoe
expertly highlights Congress' increased foray into regulatory spaces
previously occupied by state governments. He also provides an overview
of the continuing state regulations and identifies the areas in which each
state is different; thereby showcasing the problems of a unified national
regulatory system. In the second section of his article, Mr. Peskoe
explores the future of "clean electricity" generation. He offers a solution
for the state and federal dichotomy in that the federal government should
set broad goals and allow the states to best chose how to reform their own
systems to meet these long-term national priorities. He argues that the
ensuing diversity in state actions will enable innovation and encourage
imagination.
Abadir M. Ibrahim authors our final article, The Nile Basin
Cooperative Framework Agreement: The Beginning of the End of
Egyptian Hydro-Political Hegemony. This article takes us to another
continent as it explores the cultural and economical importance of the Nile
River Basin and discusses the potential impact of a new agreement entitled
the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement. Mr. Ibrahim provides
a strong overview of the history of Egypt's dominance over the region and
how countries located in the Upper River Basin have constantly battled for
control over this area. In explaining the political subterfuge that occurs
with the region's hydro-politics, Mr. Ibrahim showcases how this
underlying current influences every facet of these societies. Finally, Mr.
Ibrahim discusses the ramifications of the new Agreement and whether or
not it will be treated as a binding legal document or merely a policy
statement.
Turning to our student notes, Kristin Michael authors our first note,
What's in a Label? FIFRA Regulations and the Preemption of State Tort
Claims of Label Misrepresentation. In this note, Ms. Michael discusses
the recent case of Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Protection
Inc., and analyzes the issue of whether a marketing brochure constituted a
label and the implications of this label falling under federal pesticide
regulations or state tort requirements. Ms. Michael discusses the
repercussions of a potentially unclear U.S. Supreme Court ruling on what
actually constitutes a label and explores various scenarios under different
circuit court approaches. She argues that inconsistency in labeling
requirements makes it hard for businesses to predict and anticipate issues,
thus raising their overhead costs and passing these costs on to consumers.
Ms. Michael provides a thorough analysis of how Missouri courts may act
if faced with a similar issue and offers a solution on how to bypass the
labeling issue completely.
Katherine Vogt authors our second student note, In Closing the
Door to Environmental Public Nuisance Claims, Did the Fourth Circuit
Leave a Window Cracked? This note discusses the implications of the
case, North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, which
dealt with the use of state public nuisance law as a mechanism for
controlling emissions. Ms. Vogt discusses the history of the EPA and how
it regulates air quality, and gives a thorough overview of prior case law
attempting to utilize state tort law as an addition to the EPA regulations.
This overview of how federal environmental law may preempt state law
provides a backdrop for the ongoing public policy debates regarding
emissions and the role of the federal government. Ms. Vogt uses the
blueprint provided by the Fourth Circuit to predict how the courts may
rule on a number of "climate change cases" that have arisen due to the
inaction of the federal government to regulate greenhouse gases.
Christine Lesicko authors our third student note, Attempting to
(De)Regulate Genetically Modified Crops: The Supreme Court Overrules
the District Court's Injunction, which discusses the case of Monsanto v.
Geertson Seed Farms. The crux of this case revolved around the proper
procedure required when deregulating a genetically modified crop. Ms.
Lesicko's note explores the background and issues regarding the
regulations of genetically modified crops. Her analysis explains how
deregulation can have significant impact on the environment and thus a
complete investigation should always be required before a genetically
modified crop is released from regulation. Ms. Lesicko discusses the
potential implications of deregulating a genetically engineered crop
without taking a "hard look" at the environmental consequences and
concludes with a vote of confidence in the regulatory procedure in place as
long as it is properly followed.
Rachel Meystedt authors our final student note, Stop the Beach
Renourishment: Why Judicial Takings May Have Meant Taking a Little
Too Much, which reviews the ramifications of the case, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.
This U.S. Supreme Court case analyzed whether private property owners
had lost their property due to a "judicial taking" by the Florida Supreme
Court in violation of the Takings Clause in the Constitution. Mrs.
Meystedt discusses the concept of a judicial taking and how it currently
does not exist in American jurisprudence. In her opinion, the effect of this
is to leave property owners with no redress for their injury whenever a
judicial decision leaves them without their property. However, Mrs.
Meystedt theorizes that if judicial takings were to be recognized, the court
system would never be able to change property law for fear of a lawsuit by
the affected property owner. Her note delves into the policy and
philosophy regarding what role our judiciary should have in creating and
interpreting law. Mrs. Meystedt concludes with the opinion that the
American legal system may not be ready for the doctrine of judicial
takings, but that its implementation may not be far off.
As always, this volume ends with updates discussing recent court
holdings through the country that impact environmental law.
We would like to offer special thanks and recognition to the 2010-
2011 Editorial Board for their hard work on Volume 18 of the Journal.
This journal would not be possible without diligence, dedication and
passion for its continued success. Additionally, huge thanks are in order
for the 2011-2012 Editorial Board who contributed much to the editing of
this issue. MELPR is blessed to have such an accomplished and
committed Board that has already begun to lead the Journal to new
heights. During this year, MELPR has unveiled a new social media
initiative with the goal of promoting current and past authors' future
scholarship, and has plans in progress to host its first environmental law
symposium.
Finally, thanks goes to our advisor, Professor Thom Lambert, and
our new advisor, Professor Troy Rule, for their immeasurable help and
guidance as we put forth another edition.
MICHAEL A. MOOREFIELD
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, 2010-2011
KATHERINE E. VOGT
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, 2011-2012
